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Abstract  
 
This article explores and explains escalating contradictions between two modes of clinical risk 
management which resisted hybridisation.  Drawing on a Foucauldian perspective, these two 
modes – ethics-orientated and rules-based – are firstly characterised in an original heuristic we 
develop to analyse clinical risk management systems.  Some recent sociologically orientated 
accounting literature is introduced, exploring interactions between accountability and risk 
management regimes in corporate and organizational settings; much of this literature suggests 
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these systems are complementary or may readily form hybrids.  This theoretical literature is then 
moved into the related domain of clinical risk management systems, which has been under-
explored from this analytic perspective.  We note the rise of rules-based clinical risk 
management in UK mental health services as a distinct logic from ethics-orientated clinical self-
regulation.  Longitudinal case study data is presented, showing contradiction and escalating 
contest between ethics-orientated and rules-based systems in a high-commitment mental health 
setting, triggering a crisis and organizational closure.  We explore theoretically why perverse 
contradictions emerged, rather than complementarity and hybridisation suggested by existing 
literature.  Interactions between local conditions of strong ideological loading, high emotional 
and personal involvement, and rising rules-based risk management are seen as producing this 
contest and its dynamics of escalating and intractable conflict.  The article contributes to the 
general literature on interactions between different risk management regimes, and reveals 
specific aspects arising in clinically based forms of risk management.  It concludes by 
considering some strengths and weaknesses of this Foucauldian framing. 
Keywords:  
clinical risk management; conflict; ethics; Foucault; hybrids; mental health; organizational 
change; paradigm incommensurability; regulation 
 
Introduction: The interrelationship between two modes of clinical risk 
management – explaining non-hybridisation, escalating contradictions and 
organizational crisis. 
 
Formal risk management systems now provide a dominant and pervasive logic for governing an 
uncertain social world (Power, 2004). Such systems have expanded and colonised terrains 
previously occupied by less formalised self-regulation, including self-regulation by 
professionals.  They have proliferated in UK government, regulatory agencies and public 
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services (Power, 1997; 2004), as well as private firms.  These systems promise a means of 
dealing with potential hazards as what begins as a mere possibility of danger is converted into 
calculable objects of surveillance, regulation and control (Castel, 1991; O'Malley, 2004; Power, 
2007).   
 
Yet risk management’s claim to calculation and objectivity may overlook local values, emotions 
and practices concerning social transgressions, rule-breaking and deviancy.  For instance, by 
putting individuals’ selves and feelings ‘at risk’, formal risk systems may involve ‘cleaning-up’ 
accounts for presentation to external auditors; they may encourage individuals to hide 
malpractice, ‘game’ reporting systems and undermine corrective learning (Gabe, Exworthy, 
Jones & Smith, 2012; Iedema, Flabouris, Grant & Jorm, 2006; McGivern & Ferlie, 2007; 
McGivern & Fischer, 2012; Waring, 2009).  Risk may function above all as a moral idea in 
which the selection, handling and elaboration of risk functions to protect authoritative moral 
orders and risk management regimes meant to uphold them (Douglas, 1992).  According to this 
‘risk as moral government’ perspective, risks are not ontological facts, but social constructions 
where omissions, wrong-doing and blame are attributable to persons held accountable (Douglas, 
1992; Luhmann, 1993). 
  
If formal risk management systems operate as a form of moral government, they may also 
interact with indigenous risk practices and mentalities as individuals orientate themselves 
towards authoritative, external evaluations of their conduct (Ericson & Doyle, 2003; Ewald, 
1991; Power, 2004; 2009a).  According to Foucault’s (1979) original concept of 
governmentality, such an orientation towards risk may lead to an internalisation and 
strengthening of its rationalities, whether through compliance, participation, or even resistance 
(Gordon, 1991).   
 
But what are the empirical dynamics of interactions between ‘indigenous’ risk management 
practices and formal risk management systems?  Within the sociologically orientated accounting 
literature, recent scholarship indicates manageable tensions (Gendron, 2002; Rahaman, Neu & 
Everett, 2010), complementarity (Roberts, 1991) and ready hybridisation (Miller, Kurunmäki & 
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O'Leary, 2008) between different accountability and risk management regimes.  By contrast, 
Armstrong (1994) suggests some potential contradictions arising between different discursive 
systems.  Yet overall, this literature does not suggest conflictual interactions between formal risk 
management and indigenous risk management systems. 
 
In contrast to this literature, we argue that interactions between alternative risk management 
systems may exert perverse and intractable effects, not previously adequately considered.  
Drawing on Foucault’s (2010, 2011) recently published final lectures at the College de France, 
we develop an original heuristic to explore interactions between a rules-based mode of 
regulation, advanced by formal risk management systems, and a contrasting ethics-orientated 
mode more embedded in indigenous clinical practices.  Whereas Foucault (1992:25) defined 
morality as a ‘systematic ensemble’ of values and rules of conduct presecribed to individuals 
through authoritative institutions, he contrasted these rules-based ‘moral codes’ with the different 
ways in which individuals might interpret and relate to them.  Individuals may not merely 
conform to rules, but seek to constitute themselves as ‘ethical subjects’ through practices 
intended to transform their thoughts, emotions, and ways of being. 
 
We apply our heuristic in an empirical case of a high-commitment health care organization 
where perverse interactions between contrasting modes of risk regulation are exemplified.  
Through a longitudinal case study of a mental health care setting – a Democratic Therapeutic 
Community (DTC) – we explore dynamics between rising formal clinical risk management 
systems and pre-existing self-regulation, clinically embedded.  Whereas interactions between 
these modes are likely to be important in a number of settings, we propose the DTC may be an 
‘extreme case’ (Eisenhardt, 1989) human service organization, well-suited for studying these 
interactions that may be less apparent in other settings.  Contrary to much literature, this case 
reveals strong tension between the two modes of regulation, leading to escalating morally-
charged conflict which ultimately, we suggest, triggers a crisis and organizational closure. 
 
Our article contributes to the sociological accounting literature, firstly, by elucidating perverse 
interactions between formal risk management systems and indigenous risk management 
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practices.  Secondly, we develop a sociological perspective on a related field of clinical risk 
management systems.  Some sociologically orientated accounting literature examines corporate 
and financial accountability or risk management systems, including some health care settings 
(Miller et al., 2008; Miller & Rose, 2008; Rahaman et al., 2010).  We apply these perspectives to 
the particular domain of clinical risk management.  As clinical risk management involves 
significant first order risks (mainly to service users and clinicians), as well as second order, 
reputational risks (particularly to managers and organizations, see Power, 2007), we suggest this 
context reveals some perverse interactions, previously overlooked. 
 
The argument proceeds as follows.  Firstly, we introduce our Foucauldian heuristic, situating the 
discussion theoretically in the sociologically orientated accounting literature on interactions 
between regulatory regimes.  The growth of formal clinical risk management systems in UK 
mental health services is outlined and we introduce the DTC as a distinctive clinical setting.  We 
then describe our ethnographic research design and empirical case study, revealing escalating 
tensions between self-regulatory practices and a rising formal risk management system.  We find 
contradictions, contest, and no easy hybridisation.  These findings are discussed theoretically in 
relation to our heuristic.  We conclude by considering the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Foucauldian framing adopted, and suggest ideas for further study of interactions between risk 
management regimes. 
Literature review and theoretical emplacement 
A Foucauldian heuristic: Two contrasting modes of clinical risk management 
When discussing his core concept of ‘governmentality’, Foucault explores the developing 
capacity to govern populations indirectly, through novel knowledge bases (including psychiatry), 
segregated institutions (including the asylum), and associated micro practices, such as systems of 
registration and accounting (Foucault, Burchell & Gordon, 1991).  A governmentality 
perspective is thus promising in analysing regulatory regimes in mental health care.  Yet we are 
interested in how Foucault’s thought evolved, especially in his recently published final lectures 
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on The Government of Self and Others (Foucault 2010; 2011).  Whereas early Foucauldian 
analysis focused on technologies of power-knowledge and its internalisation by docile subjects 
(Foucault, 1977), he became increasingly interested in how subjects form a relationship with 
themselves, whether as subjects of disciplinary power or potentially as ‘intensely free’, self-
actualising subjects (Foucault, 1988; Veyne, 2010).  Foucault’s later libertarian ideas explored 
distinctive themes of personal ethics, desire and self development, realised through freely-
embraced self discipline (Starkey & McKinlay, 1998), linked to social praxis (Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
 
Through exploring shifts in notions of morality between Greco-Roman, early Christian and 
modern secular periods, Foucault (2005) distinguished between ethics-orientated practices of 
personal conduct, important in antiquity, from rules-based codes prescribed and mediated by 
authority, more dominant in later periods (Kosmala & McKernan, 2010). 
 
These contrasting schemas involve distinct forms of subjectivity.  In the ethics-orientated mode 
of Greco-Roman culture, subjects may seek to actively constitute themselves as ethical subjects 
through ascetic exercises to establish an ethical foundation for engaging with the social world 
(Kosmala & McKernan, 2010).  As Foucault (2010; 2011) argues, this ethics orientation seeks  
ethical self-government in oneself and others, accomplished through relations of care.  
Omissions and errors are regarded not as breaches of moral codes, but intrinsic to formative 
learning.  By contrast, the code-orientated mode, more dominant later, involves governing 
oneself and others through truth obligations in the form of rules mediated by authorities.  ‘Moral 
conduct’ means becoming a subject of external truth, involving self-renunciation, conversion and 
rituals of atonement (Foucault, 2005; Foucault & Blasius, 1993).  Subjective and experiential 
knowledge is subjugated to ideals of objective truth, requiring self-examination, confession, and 
‘deciphering’ of the subject by authorities. 
 
Although these two modes are historically situated, Foucault (1996) considered them relevant to 
contemporary forms of government.  Subjugation to external authority involves internalisation of 
a dominant moral discourse, where subjects put their confidence in credible and authoritative 
notions of truth and attempt to self-consciously reform themselves through adherence to its rules.  
7 
 
However, an ethics-orientated mode seeks to produce more autonomous individuals, self-
constituted through more contested and ‘agonistic’ relations to domination (Foucault, 2005; 
2010).  This ethics-orientated mode entails social practices that involve neither subjection to 
moral codes, nor retreat from the social world, but seek ethical government through 
intersubjective relations of care, along with freespoken, practical critique (Foucault 2011). 
 
We suggest these two modes of Foucauldian subjectivity offer a heuristically useful lens to 
explore contrasting forms of clinical risk management.  According to Foucault (1992:24), risk 
handling may involve not merely subjects’ compliance with rules of conduct, but practices 
involving a ‘whole mental endeavour’ of vigilance, intention and attitude, designed to avert 
dangers and contribute to the security of social groups.  Whereas formal risk management 
systems emphasise regulatory control, informal, indigenous forms entail active co-production 
with service users, involving self-regulation. 
 
How might we operationalise such a heuristic?  Firstly, an ethics-orientated mode suggests 
linked clinical and social practices may ‘transform’ the self through care of oneself and others, 
seeking to develop therapeutic intersubjective relations.  Clinical risk is understood and managed 
interpersonally, emphasising intense engagement in ethical relations, accompanied by active 
reflection and personal responsibility.  It involves higher tolerance of risk, regarded as providing 
opportunities for personal learning through interpersonal feedback and challenge.  Clinical risk 
management is here inherently co-produced between participants who might genuinely seek 
personal transformation and development. 
 
By contrast, a rules-based mode suggests adherence to explicit rules and calculations of 
probability, with recording and reporting to external authorities.  Clinical risk is understood and 
managed as an expert technology, practised by clinicians and managers.  Rules-based clinical 
risk management distrusts experiential, subjective knowledge, and service users would be 
regarded as unpredictable and potentially dangerous.  They would not be expected to 
authentically engage in therapy, so requiring expert supervision and management.  This mode 
involves low tolerance of deviance and risk.  Second order evidence of risk management is 
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emphasised (Power, 2009b), involving demonstrable self-examination, confession of ‘deviance’, 
and externally verified conversion.  Clinical risk management here emphasises internalisation of 
rules-based codes by service users, clinicians and managers to increase self-conscious 
compliance with dominant ideals. 
 
Whereas these contrasting modes involve different kinds of subjectivity, interactions between 
them may be more nuanced than this heuristic suggests.  As Kosmala and McKernan (2010) 
write, a self-constituting, ethics-orientated subject is never entirely independent of moral codes, 
as social frameworks are “proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society and 
his social group” (Foucault 1996: 41).  Whereas we have so far outlined distinct modes, some 
scholars suggest these might come together and blend in interesting ways (see Kurunmäki, 2004; 
Miller et al., 2008).  Townley (1994), for instance, argues that disciplinary practices in Human 
Resource Management (HRM) may take a rules-based form that objectifies individuals as 
examined and inscribed subjects, as well as an ethics-orientated form emphasising subjective 
experience, intersubjectivity and minimal domination.  But HRM practices may also take a third 
approach, aligning organizational objectives with individuals by attempting to produce self-
managing, ‘productive subjects’.  Such hybrid practices seek to increase and make visible self-
conscious and reflexive knowledge, whilst experiential and relational self-regulation is 
subjugated in favour of (internalised) expert knowledge (Townley, 1994).   
 
According to these authors’ perspectives, ethics-orientated and rules-based modes of regulation 
might be predicted to combine to produce possible hybrid forms.  We capture in Figure 1 the 
main differences between these modes of clinical risk management, highlighting four main 
distinctions, derived from our reading of Foucault’s (2010; 2011) final lectures on The 
Government of Self and Others.  These distinctions are (a) their contrasting truth discourses and 
(b) ‘practices of the self’, in which (c) subjects’ reflexivity is sensitised towards alternative 
sources of self-knowledge, and (d) where intersubjective relations are variously regarded as 
either important or untrustworthy aspects of managing substantive risks.  But what would 
possible hybridisation look like in our case?  For the purposes of developing our heuristic, we 
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speculatively outline in this figure a possible third mode, drawing on the on the hybrid regulation 
ideas of Miller and colleagues (2008; Kurunmäki, 2004). 
 
 Ethics-orientated Rules-based Possible Hybrid 
Truth 
discourses  
Truth of clinical risk is 
‘discovered’ through 
subjective knowledge, 
coproduced with others.  
Risk management is through 
self-mastery and inducing 
ethical forms of government 
in self and others. 
Ideals of objective truth and 
calculable knowledge are 
codified and distrust 
subjective knowledge.  Risk 
management is through 
adhering to rules & ensuring 
compliance by others. 
Blended truth discourses 
assimilate code-based truth 
with subjective knowledge.  
Risk management is through 
internalising external rules, 
assimilating them into the 
care of oneself and others. 
Practices 
 
Practices of risk 
management link tolerance 
of deviance with self-
development.  Social praxis 
is integrated with shared 
learning. 
Risk management is seen as 
an expert technology, 
requiring recording and 
reporting of deviance to 
experts.  Self-development 
involves conversion to 
external ideals. 
Practices are readily 
combined and internalised, 
hybridising expert 
technologies with 
indigenous practices.  Low 
tolerance of deviance 
produces a proliferation of 
techniques, with rules-based 
practices more dominant. 
Reflexivity Reflexivity is sensitised 
towards ‘horizontal 
relations’.  Social relations 
and relations with oneself 
are reflected on in the 
service of mutual learning 
and self-development. 
Reflexive self-
consciousness is directed 
‘vertically’, towards the 
perspective of external 
authority.  Self-examination 
and ‘confession’ to 
authorities are mediated 
through internalised rules. 
Reflexive sensitivity to 
horizontal relations is 
mediated by self-
consciousness towards 
authorities’ perspectives.  
Self-examination and self-
monitoring draw upon 
external rules. 
Intersubjective 
relations 
Authentically engaged 
intersubjective relations are 
held as key to substantive 
clinical risk management.  
Mutual responsibility is 
promoted through active and 
outspoken care of oneself 
and others. 
 
Intersubjective relations are 
held as untrustworthy and 
subject to sanctioned 
authority relations. Personal 
accountability is stressed, 
involving transparent self-
revelation to authorities, 
attributing blame, and 
visibly punishing culpability 
Authentic intersubjective 
relations are balanced by an 
orientation to authority 
relations.  Responsibility for 
risk management is 
promoted through ensuring 
mutual adherence to 
external rules, and 
punishing deviance. 
 
Fig. 1 A Foucauldian heuristic: three modes of clinical risk management 
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However, is hybridisation the only possible scenario?  In the next section, we turn to some 
sociological accounting literature which suggests alternative forms of interaction, from 
hybridisation to complementarity, managed tensions, and possible contradictions. 
 
Interactions between risk management systems: hybrids, complementarities, managed 
tension or contradiction?  
  
Hybridisation 
Hybrids may be defined as composite phenomena produced by elements usually found 
separately.  In biology, for example, hybrids are produced by crossing different species.  In 
organizational terms, hybrids similarly represent a composite of two distinct modes of organizing 
that achieve a degree of stability and longevity (Latour, 1993; Miller et al., 2008) 
 
Within the risk management field, the notion of hybrids suggests that interactions between 
diverse elements may produce a ready combination and fusion of practices, processes and 
knowledges.  Miller and colleagues (2008) find that heterogeneous and disparate elements 
between contrasting regulation regimes can constantly mix up and link.  These readily combine 
to produce new hybrid forms, in “a continually inventive process, in which proliferation and 
multiplication is the norm’ (Miller et al., 2008: 961).  They argue that such hybrids can produce 
stable states that are resilient and overcome internal contradictions.   
 
Why might such risk management hybrids proliferate?  One driver is the movement of dominant 
risk practices through interorganizational networks that cross boundaries and penetrate individual 
organizations.  A second driver is likely to be the movement of knowledge and expertise across 
boundaries, as if ideas move through some inherent force: ‘novel types of expertise emerge, too, 
as financial expertise comes increasingly to be mixed up with other types of expertise, which 
earlier were viewed as distinctive and bounded if not its antithesis’ (Miller et al., 2008: 952).  
For example, in the field of health care, financial and medical expertise may readily hybridise.  
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Comparing health systems in Finland and the UK following managerial reforms, Kurunmäki 
(2004) finds that in Finland, doctors readily combined medical knowledge with new financial 
knowledge, forming new hybrid knowledges including budget setting, cost calculations and 
setting prices.  Amongst doctors in the UK, the hybridisation of financial and clinical knowledge 
has also proceeded, although more slowly. 
 
Such hybridisation may have unexpected effects, though, as it may be impossible to control 
hybrid technologies that can ‘take on a life of their own’:  
 
“Technologies produce unexpected problems, are utilized for their own ends by those 
who are supposed to merely operate them, are hampered by underfunding, professional 
rivalries, and the impossibility of producing the technical conditions that would make 
them work...Unplanned outcomes emerge from the intersection of one technology with 
another, or from the unexpected consequence of putting a technique to work....The will to 
govern needs to be understood less in terms of its success than in terms of the difficulties 
of operationalising it” (Miller & Rose, 2008: 35). 
 
Applied to our empirical case, a hybridisation perspective predicts a stable and enduring fusion 
of ethics-orientated (clinical) and rules-based (more managerial) modes, influenced by rising 
rules-based clinical risk management, rather than merely co-existence or indeed possible tensions 
between these modes. 
 
Complementarity 
Complementarity suggests that certain entities (in this case, risk management systems) may 
come together in ways that mutually complete and add value to each other.  Interactions between 
contrasting forms of regulation may be complementary as they provide a broader spectrum of 
possible responses.   
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Roberts (1991; 2001) and colleagues (Roberts, Sanderson, Barker & Hendry, 2006) explore this 
possibility in corporate governance systems where ‘individualising forms of accountability’ 
create authoritative fields of visibility by offering a remote view of corporate conduct.  Through 
technologies such as annual financial reports and briefings for analysts and institutional 
investors, there can be fuller corporate disclosure.  However, such visibility can also produce 
anxious and defensive effects, “creating a narcissistic preoccupation with how the self and its 
activities will be seen and judged” (Roberts, 2001:1553).  ‘Socialising processes of 
accountability’, by contrast, emphasise sense-making, open communication and dialogue through 
face-to-face meetings such as in canteen chat or, more formally, in a board of directors.  The 
balance between individualistic and socialising modes of accountability may vary, but a 
preferred form – if it can be created – is the ‘complementary mode’, with a slight dominance of 
the socialising mode, supported by extensive external disclosure.  Roberts (2001) argues that in 
order to support coherence of internal processes and their effective leadership, the socialising 
mode would remain dominant within face-to-face meetings, while external disclosure acts as a 
‘fail-safe’ device if this socialising mode is compromised, by bringing in external discipline to 
address poor performance.  Nonetheless, he concedes that such ‘creative’ complementarity 
entails a particularly difficult balance between individualising and socialising modes. 
 
Applied to our empirical study, this complementary perspective suggests that an ethics-orientated 
mode would remain the default mode within the DTC, supported and enhanced by the rules-
based mode as required, potentially remedying difficulties arising within community 
relationships (see Roberts, 2001:1566). 
 
Managed tension 
By contrast, Gendron (2002) and Rahaman et al (2010) find that disparate governance regimes 
produce tensions; yet they argue that these can be managed and may be functional.  Gendron 
(2002) examined client acceptance decisions by auditors in large Canadian Professional Services 
Firms, where taking on lucrative but risky clients increases the probability of litigation.  
Competing commercial and professional logics of action are here radically distinct, producing 
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levels of tension that can produce significant and overt conflict.  However, Gendron (2002) 
found formal organizations can reduce contradictions and manage tensions through influencing 
local actions.  By deliberately conveying mixed signals through corporate systems, firms could 
support the dominant logic, while the subordinate logic remained legitimate.  Managing tensions 
in this way was regarded as advantageous, through subjecting the dominant logic to review and 
challenge. 
 
Rahaman et al’s (2010) slightly different perspective seeks to hold ‘competing regimes of 
practice’ in balance so that neither one dominates the other.  In exploring interactions between 
accounting practices and delivering HIV/AIDS programmes in Ghanaian Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), Rahaman et al (2010) found requirements to produce annual work plans 
and financial records had disruptive effects, as health care professionals were diverted into tasks 
for which they had not been trained.  In managing this tension they responded strategically to 
create visible ‘easy wins’ for external audiences by “changing their health and prevention 
activities to both conform to funding rules and to maximise the probability of receiving future 
funding” (Rahaman et al., 2010: 118).  Here we see a mixture of face compliance and gaming; 
there is enduring tension between competing regimes, yet no open confrontation. 
 
In applying managed tension perspectives to our case study, we would expect to find a 
subordinated ethics-orientated mode being managed in tension with a dominating rules-based 
mode.  Formal organizations would manage local tensions, resulting in the ethics-orientated 
mode being maintained to review and challenge rules-based regulation (Gendron 2002), or being 
strategically managed, even if partially disrupted (Rahaman et al 2010). 
 
Overt contest, incompatibility and contradiction 
A final possibility is of incompatibility and contest between different clinical risk regulation 
regimes.  Here we draw on Armstrong’s (1994) review of Foucault’s influence on accounting 
research, in which he argues that empirical examples of ‘incompatibilities between regimes of 
truth’ point to internal contradictions and contest in disciplinary systems, which appear under-
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examined in much Foucauldian scholarship.  Armstrong (1994) questions what he sees as an 
‘over-socialised’ notion of subjectivity in Foucault’s work on governmentality, in which 
dominant truths are readily internalised, yet which also recognises resistance and contest in the 
form of local insurrections (such as in prisons) and subjugated knowledges (such as deviant 
subcultures in prisons): 
 
“If resistance and subjugated knowledges are fashioned from materials extrinsic to the 
prevailing regimes of truth, the manner and co-existence of these different ‘truths’ need 
to be explored” (Armstrong, 1994: 33). 
 
Interestingly, it is to such questions of resistance, conflict and ‘philosophical militancy’ that 
Foucault (2011) eventually turns in his final course of lectures at the College de France, entitled 
The Courage of Truth, suggesting that overt contest between truth regimes may indeed be a 
possibility.  As applied to our case study, this perspective suggests contradiction and contest 
between ‘incommensurable’ (Armstrong 1994) ethics-orientated and rules-based modes of 
regulation. 
 
In summary, our review of the literature explores the interrelationship between two contrasting 
clinical risk management regimes relevant to a mental health care setting.  Theoretically, we 
have drawn on a broadly Foucauldian perspective, and developed a heuristic to analyse clinical 
risk management systems in our empirical case.  In then reviewing some sociological accounting 
literature, we have explored varying interactions between different accountability systems, 
including hybridisation, complementarity and managed tension – as well as contest, 
incompatibility and contradiction. 
 
A Democratic Therapeutic Community – a high commitment mental health 
setting 
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We next consider patterns of interaction between a rising rules-based mode and an embedded 
ethics-orientated mode of clinical risk management found in an unusual mental health inpatient 
(residential) setting: a DTC.  As Eisenhardt (1989) argues, such atypical ‘extreme cases’ may be 
useful for studying dynamics that are more difficult to observe in other settings.  The objects of 
the rising risk management system in this case include not only individual residents regarded as 
presenting a significant risk of harm to themselves and others, but also clinical staff and 
managers, formally responsible for managing clinical risk. 
 
Responding to high profile incidents involving people with severe personality disorder in the late 
1990s, the UK Department of Health developed new services to treat this problematic and 
potentially dangerous group.  Severe personality disorders are regarded as challenging to manage 
and treat.  They are deemed to act impulsively without regard to consequences; they are 
associated with self-harm, suicide and homicide, and they have poor clinical prognosis.  
Accordingly, they have been described as ‘the most difficult people to be encountered in clinical 
practice... (their) emotional impact on staff…ranges from anxiety to sudden unexpected anger 
and exhaustion... Their potential to act in dangerous ways and disrupt hospital settings makes 
them unattractive’ (Moran, 1999: 21).   
 
Attempting to manage this severe personality disorder group through control-orientated 
responses tends to exacerbate these problems because they attenuate service users’ autonomy and 
clinical relationships tend to be become control-dominated and dysfunctional, leading to further 
deterioration (Adshead & Jacob, 2009; Bateman & Tyrer, 2004).  Conversely, the Reed Report 
(1994:16)
2
 argued the distinctive clinical approach of DTCs “have shown the most promising 
results of any form of treatment...in terms of psychological and behavioural changes during 
                                                 
 
2
 The Reed Committee was established by the UK Government to review services for mentally disordered offenders 
and examine in detail the needs of offenders with psychopathic disorder. 
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treatment, reduction of violent incidents in treatment settings, significant improvements 
following treatment and, sometimes, in the maintenance of these changes following treatment”  
 
The Reed Report (Department of Health & Home Office, 1992; Reed, 1994) recommended the 
development of DTCs rather than prisons or secure hospitals in managing these conditions.  
Taking as a model a well-established DTC with a coherent clinical model dating from the 1940s, 
the UK Government established two new DTCs (including the one we studied) in the early 2000s 
to provide a national service.  We studied one of these new DTCs which had about 30 male and 
female residents. 
 
The national DTC service was managed within the National Health Service (NHS) as an 
experimental policy innovation.  Unlike most NHS services which are locally commissioned, and 
governed through local NHS Trusts, DTCs were commissioned by a specialist national 
commissioning group, linked to the Department of Health.  The DTCs had formal accountability 
relationships with national NHS commissioners, responsible for monitoring performance against 
contracts.  However, each DTC was hosted by a local NHS Trust which was operationally 
responsible for the units, including their clinical governance – a form of corporate governance, 
focused on the delivery of care. (Department of Health, 1999a)  
 
The DTC therapeutic model is distinct from other mental health services (Campling & Haigh, 
1999), its principles have been well documented (Lees, Manning, Menzies & Morant, 2004; 
Rapoport, 1960), and they were strongly replicated in this new site (Ormrod, Ferlie, Warren & 
Norton, 2007).  Especially salient is the model’s philosophy of ‘community as doctor’ (Rapoport, 
1960) emphasising collective treatment through a resocialisation programme, addressing severe 
emotional and behavioural problems.  DTCs are residential settings, often geographically 
separated from other health care services.  Residents live in the unit for an extended period of 
twelve months.  There is a blurring of roles between staff and residents, and the term ‘residents’ 
is used to differentiate their active participation from the more passive role of patients in other 
mental health services.   
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The DTC has a strong group-based culture and therapeutic model that encourages interpersonal 
engagement.  All therapy takes place in group settings; residents are expected to take 
responsibility for their own and others’ treatment as ‘co-therapists’, and to participate in 
community decision-making and community tasks.  To increase openness to emotions and 
sensitivity to relational dynamics, residents are required to withdraw from psychotropic 
medication before joining the community, and to abstain from alcohol and drugs. 
 
Residents join voluntarily after being assessed and interviewed by the community, testing their 
commitment to intensive therapy.  The community votes democratically on whom to admit and 
discharge, or whether to ‘evict’ residents deemed untreatable or not authentically engaged.  Such 
evictions might take place without prior post-discharge planning.  Although a principle of 
permissiveness tolerates interpersonal disturbances and ‘acting out’, this is constrained by 
counter principles of communalism, reality-confrontation and democratisation (Rapoport, 1960).  
These principles promote strong, personal engagement in community life by openly providing 
and receiving feedback, holding each other to account, and being confronted with the 
consequences of damaging community relations.  All members are expected to clarify each 
other’s positions, understand others’ concerns, and explore solutions mutually. 
 
In these ways, formal external accountability is balanced by strong indigenous orientation to 
community decision-making, while an elected hierarchy in the resident group provides senior 
residents with some local authority.  Senior residents may be elected to the ‘Top Three’ resident 
positions, responsible for chairing daily community meetings, selection meetings for new 
residents, and deciding with staff how to respond to problems that arise.  Through democratic 
decision-making, residents can over-rule staff decisions.  Clinical risk is actively handled 
through face-to-face meetings that attempt to cultivate authentic exchanges.  Meetings of the 
entire community are called frequently to manage disturbances and address wider repercussions.  
The declared ‘culture of enquiry’ (Lees et al, 2004) involves reflecting and questioning to enable 
the community to develop collectively, as part of the treatment model. 
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The staff team is comprised of a senior group of three consultant psychiatrists (medical doctors) 
including a medical director, clinical psychologists, psychotherapists, specialist nurses and social 
workers, as well as ‘social therapists’ (usually psychology graduates) a business manager and 
administrative staff.  Social therapists and administrative staff are asked to bring non-clinical, lay 
perspectives and social norms that are intended to be less professionalised, and thus closer to 
residents’ own experiences.  All staff are expected to participate in the day-to-day running of the 
community, along with residents, involving communal tasks such as preparing food, cleaning 
and gardening, as well as community decision-making.  However, staff also have particular 
clinical responsibilities: some senior therapists conduct psychotherapy groups, art therapy and 
psychodrama, while the wider staff group conducts gardening and social activities, and facilitates 
discharge planning and aftercare meetings.   
 
There is a flattened (although not flat) hierarchy within the staff team and staff are expected to 
speak authentically with each other, challenging each other’s judgements and assumptions.  This 
is intended to surface marginal perspectives (including those of visitors and students), balancing 
formal expertise with intuitive and felt experiences.  The full staff team meets daily, and staff 
attend community meetings with residents several times each day, allowing for direct and 
continuous review of clinical and community affairs.   
 
Although the clinical director (the most senior medical doctor) is formally responsible for the 
DTC, and reports to the NHS Trust chief executive (CEO), a clinical management team (a senior 
nurse, psychologist and consultant psychiatrists) limits the clinical director’s formal authority 
through upholding the DTC’s decision-making principles.  All staff attend a weekly ‘reflective 
staff group’ intended to explore and resolve internal tensions.  This is facilitated by an external 
consultant psychotherapist who comments on, interprets and challenges group dynamics.  To 
increase adherence to the original DTC model, this DTC is part of a ‘community of 
communities’ through which mixed teams of residents and staff visit each other’s communities 
several times a year to question, challenge and learn from each other’s practices. 
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We suggest that the DTC’s distinctive therapeutic model reflects a Foucauldian ‘ethics-
orientated’ mode of clinical risk management.  Through mutual engagement in a therapeutic 
milieu, residents seek to liberate themselves from ‘disordered’ patterns of relating to themselves 
and others.  In particular, it may be a final chance to transform long-established dysfunctional 
patterns of engaging with authority, through shared learning, reflection, and developing authentic 
interpersonal relations (see Coid, 2003). 
 
Yet the DTC’s democratic approach may also present risks such as manipulation, negative group 
dynamics such as scapegoating and emotional ‘contagion’, leading to collective disturbances 
(Baron, 1987; Barsade, 2002).  The model thus has important implications for clinical risk 
management.  There is firstly, likely to be higher tolerance of clinical risk as crises are treated as 
opportunities for remedial exchanges.  Secondly, clinical risk is managed interpersonally through 
community meetings which reinforce mutual engagement, but may increase ‘relational 
turbulence’ within and between groups (Fischer, 2012).  Thirdly, decision-making is shared, 
democratically determined and supported rather than imposed through hierarchical power 
relations, but this might limit influences of professional judgement.  Finally, small group settings 
such as this may create challenging group dynamics internally, presenting additional risks that 
may be difficult to address in a communal spirit. 
Rising formal clinical risk management in NHS mental health services 
Although the national DTC service was developed in the early 2000s, its democratic-therapeutic 
model sat awkwardly with concurrent, UK mental health policy changes.  High-profile 
homicides committed by people with severe mental disorder led to legislation to detain the 
‘dangerous’ mentally ill, based on presumed risk to the public (Department of Health, 1998; 
Maden, 2007).   
 
Forensic psychiatry was influential in these shifts in policy and practice, as severe personality 
disorder was brought into mental health law and clinical risk management systems, especially 
through a new medico-legal category of ‘Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder’ (DSPD).  
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While the Royal College of Psychiatrists and civil liberty groups argued against individuals seen 
as ‘clinically untreatable’ being detained in hospitals (Feeney, 2003; Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 2008), the UK Government introduced policies to detain patients in secure settings, 
based on the notion of “serious risk such people present to the public” (Department of Health & 
Home Office, 1999:6).  New high secure services were developed in the field of DSPD, 
reflecting public and political concerns about dangerousness (Heyman, Shaw, Davies, Godin & 
Reynolds, 2004; Manning, 2003), while formal clinical risk management systems developed 
structured actuarial scales to calculate ‘psychopathic risk’, probabilities of violence and re-
offending (Dolan & Doyle, 2000; Langan, 2010).  Forensically-orientated risk assessment and 
risk management thus became a central focus in mental health policy and clinical practice 
(Brown, 2006; Manning, 2003).   
 
In this context, a statutory Care Programme Approach (Department of Health, 1999b) was 
developed as an administrative framework for differentiating and managing mental health 
patients according to levels of risk, supervising those deemed high risk (Godin, 2004).  This 
clinical risk management framework involves a designated care coordinator to assess and record: 
“the nature of any risk posed and the arrangements for the management of this risk to the 
service user and to others, carers and the wider public, including the circumstances in which 
defined contingency action should be taken” (Department of Health, 1999b:53).   Its operation 
places accountability on named professionals; indeed, homicide inquiries have tended to 
scapegoat such named practitioners (Ryan, 2004).   
 
How might the DTCs be influenced by the rising rules-based clinical risk management system?  
The three DTCs were centrally commissioned by the Department of Health, and they might be 
expected to have come under increasing central surveillance.  As a high profile and unusual 
policy initiative, their clinical and performance activity was externally evaluated, as was the new 
units’ effectiveness in replicating the original DTC model.  The DTC we studied had frequent 
contact with the national commissioners, as well as its local NHS Trust.  While formal risk 
management methods were increasing externally, the DTC’s emphasis on building strong 
relationships with residents was initially regarded as an effective model of clinical risk 
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management.  Despite the DTCs’ well-established methods, they adapted and interpreted outside 
influences such as the Care Programme Approach, using these to strengthen in-house methods.  
In our study, the DTC was initially described by its NHS Trust’s CEO as the Trust’s ‘jewel in the 
crown’, held to exemplify the Trust’s stated principles of service user engagement.  In the longer 
term, however, the DTC’s distinctive system of clinical risk management became increasingly 
isolated from rising formal risk management systems externally.   
 
A longitudinal and ethnographic organizational case study – methods and 
data  
Our empirical data are drawn from a four-year ethnographic study of interorganizational 
relations between one new DTC and its external referral agencies in health, social care and 
criminal justice organizations, spanning public, private and voluntary sectors across three 
conurbations and a rural area.
3
  Given well-documented difficulties in coordinating 
interorganizational approaches for this challenging population (Coid, 2003), early insight into the 
DTC’s atypical methods (see Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995) suggested an initial broad theme 
of interorganizational collaboration. 
 
One author (MF) worked in the region as a clinical consultant and had pre-existing professional 
links with the NHS Trust, permitting access to the DTC as an ‘insider’.  However, his role in the 
DTC was solely that of PhD researcher; he had no other professional involvement with the DTC.  
The other author (EF) acted as his second PhD supervisor with particular responsibility for 
organizational and policy themes.  These origins influenced study design.  There were fewer 
difficulties in winning insider status than in other ethnographies (e.g. Schouten & Alexander, 
1995).  However, these links were with senior professional staff and not with service users.  In an 
                                                 
 
3
 The study was part of self-funded PhD research (Fischer, 2008) 
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early meeting to negotiate research access, residents requested the study should be extended from 
its original interorganizational focus, to include participant observation within the DTC and 
interviews with residents, to understand their ‘real’ experience.  The research design evolved, 
therefore, in consultation with participants, moving towards the broad experience of the DTC as 
a setting, including its interorganizational relations.  Gaining research ethics approval across 
multiple agencies was protracted (16 months), but this enabled wider interagency relationships to 
be developed.  Consistent with this emergent design, our ethnographic methodology explored 
participants’ activities, beliefs, meanings, values and motivations, seeking to interpret 
organizational and social worlds as members did themselves (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995).   
 
Over a period of four years, ethnographic observation, 76 formal interviews and numerous 
informal interviews were conducted across DTC-related external agencies as well as within the 
DTC.  Formal in-depth interviews (1½ to 2 hours duration) were conducted with practitioners 
and managers across public, voluntary and private sector organizations, as well as with 
government representatives, NHS commissioners, service users, relatives and user groups.  The 
researcher observed meetings, interorganizational (outreach) projects, and followed individual 
‘cases’ as residents were referred to and discharged from the DTC.  Following Spradley (1979), a 
loosely-structured interview guide ‘funnelled’ interviews from initially descriptive questions to a 
more specified focus.  As is characteristic of ethnographic interviewing, interviews had an 
informal, conversational style, giving priority to exploring participants’ perspectives rather than 
seeking answers to specific questions (Charmaz, 2006).  A second phase focused on the DTC 
following a critical incident that took place during fieldwork, exploring its effects on external 
and internal relations.  Numerous informal interviews were conducted over the total period of 
this research (seven years in total), which informed our understanding of the field, but to comply 
with research ethics approval, these were not included in the formal dataset. 
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Table 1  
Summary of Fieldwork 
 
Phase I Participant-observation Formal Interviews 
 Hours Days/meetings 
observed 
 
DTC  42 9 15 
Interorganizational 
‘outreach’ projects 
51 15 14 
Former residents 7 1 4 
External agencies   32 
Phase II    
DTC  95 10 3 
NHS officials   8 
TOTAL - Phases I & II 195 35 76 
 
 
Observations and interviews were triangulated against texts collected throughout the study.  
These texts consisted of emails and correspondence, minutes of meetings, policy documents and 
proposals, copies of confidential inquiries, newspaper clippings, organizational performance 
figures and committee reports.  This material highlighted overlooked areas of investigation and 
shed light on conflicting accounts. 
 
Aiming to be immersed in the field, yet retain freedom of movement and thought, the researcher 
adopted an observation-orientated approach.  ‘Observing in order to write’ supported close 
attention to dialogue during meetings (Emerson, 2001), yet permitted wider participation such as 
informal exchanges during coffee breaks or over lunch, participating in social activities and 
sharing car journeys.  Exchanges at the periphery of meetings deepened field relations, allowing 
insight into backstage behaviours and unofficial perspectives in which personal material and 
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mutual interests were shared (as described by Schouten & Alexander, 1995).  These informal 
exchanges led to important personal involvement (Gans, 1999), permitting ethnographic insight 
through ‘subjecting oneself’ to the same situation and experiences of other participants (Van 
Maanen, 2011).  Detailed observational notes and personal reflections were recorded later each 
day after on-site work. 
 
While this design opened access to backstage regions, it presented additional demands on 
managing the fieldwork role.  Although participants generally accepted the observer role in 
meetings, there were often ‘inclusive overtures’4 (Emerson & Pollner, 2001) outside them.  This 
entailed navigating between invitations for further involvement, whilst declining participants’ 
requests to join local advisory groups, undertake research for members’ organizations and 
contribute to other local purposes.  The researcher treated such proximity not as providing 
insight per se, but as significant material requiring further, reflexive questioning of his reactions 
to the setting (Hinshelwood & Skogstad, 2000).  Negotiating levels of involvement in members’ 
worlds provided useful access and supported a ‘snowballing’ sampling technique, sometimes 
giving access to backstage areas.  For instance, residents invited the researcher to stay overnight 
(democratically outvoting the objections of DTC leaders), to allow participant-observation of 
informal aspects of residents’ lives in the community, hosted by the Top Three residents rather 
than duty staff, (this is an interesting example of role-blurring). 
 
During informal activities the researcher role was more participative: preparing food, shopping 
and doing household chores, developing friendships with residents and staff in the DTC, chatting 
outside with smokers, and securing the building against intruders at night time.  Such informal 
involvement revealed behaviours and attitudes usually concealed to staff.  For instance, whilst 
helping a junior staff member fix a bicycle, the staff member privately revealed his ambivalence 
                                                 
 
4
 Emerson and Pollner (2001) describe ‘inclusive overtures’ as part of the dynamics of inclusion and distance in 
fieldwork relations, as indigenous members draw fieldworkers towards certain activities and forms of participation . 
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about the DTC model.  Residents’ curiosity about the research prompted personal disclosures 
about their experiences.  Gaining access to the backstage areas of community life surfaced 
insider perspectives on staff-resident tensions.  The researcher recorded such observations  later, 
waiting for a natural break before finding somewhere quiet to write.   
 
Balancing involvement and critical distance is a common dilemma in ethnography (Schouten & 
Alexander, 1995).  Critical distance was sought, firstly, by exploring diverse perspectives from 
external agencies, service user (patients) and pressure groups as well as DTC members, NHS 
Trust managers and government officials.  Secondly, in-depth interviews cultivated researcher 
sensitivity to alternative interpretive schemes, particularly through studying fieldwork incidents 
and accounts from different perspectives (Emerson 2001).  Finally, an orientation to critical 
reflexivity (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000) was developed through fieldwork diaries, writing 
reflexive memos, and regular discussion with PhD supervisors of emerging empirical and 
analytic themes, including the researcher’s personal responses to the material (see Arnaud, 
2012). 
 
Fieldnotes and interviews were transcribed and NVivo software was used to assist data 
management and analysis.  A modified grounded theory method was used at this stage in 
analysing ethnographic fieldnotes, using key incidents and memo-writing to move from open to 
focused coding (see Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001; Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 1995).  This analysis 
was originally developed in a PhD thesis (Fischer, 2008) within a broadly group-psychoanalytic 
framing.  A clear empirical focus within the PhD was the organizational crisis and sudden 
closure, precipitated by a critical incident (a homicide).   
 
Theory was developed from this analytic focus through comparing deviant cases (Katz, 2001), 
and revising analytic concepts and memos, using a loose initial framing.  In Gendron and 
Bédard’s (2006) social constructionist account of the constitution of audit committees within 
Canadian firms, they firstly used a loose framing, later focusing their analysis by bringing in 
theoretical literature on actor reflectivity.  Similarly, we drew upon theoretical literature to frame 
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our analysis of contrasting modes of clinical risk management.  We firstly explored Foucauldian 
scholarship on governmentality, focused on mundane techniques of audit and risk management 
(McKinlay & Starkey, 1998; Miller & Rose, 2008; Power, 1997; 2007), then later broadened our 
focus to include Foucault’s late scholarship on ‘technologies of the self’.  Through our reading of 
this literature, we developed a guiding theoretical framework as a heuristic to act as a mid-level 
sense-making device (see Figure 1).  This allowed us to move iteratively between data and 
theory to produce our empirically-grounded framework (see Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The DTC’s ethics-orientated mode of clinical risk management  
In its early ethics-orientated phase, the DTC presents as a high commitment setting in which 
residents and staff are interpersonally and emotionally engaged.  The DTC’s clinical model 
emphasises sincere relational engagement and shared commitment to democratically-held rules 
as its essential method of managing clinical risk.  Despite its ‘high risk’ population, the DTC is 
governed through residents’ and staff members’ commitment to a complex set of rules and 
structured programme of groups, developed over the 60-year history of the original DTC.  These 
rules are strongly maintained by the community and they are seen by residents and staff as 
integral in building trust and collaboration within the DTC, and in sustaining the community as a 
‘safe place’.  Such personal commitment is regarded as central to handling the relational 
problems of people with severe personality disorder, such as strong negative reactions to 
hierarchical authority and a tendency to readily disengage from clinical treatment (Lees et al., 
2004; Manning, 1989).  Its democratic-therapeutic approach contrasts with how formal systems 
seek to manage severe personality disorder through increasing physical security, actuarial risk 
calculations by professionals, and close integration with the criminal justice system (Exworthy & 
Gunn, 2003; Seddon, 2008; Tyrer, 2007). 
 
For residents accustomed to other health care settings, the DTC’s participative methods can offer 
an idealised ‘place of hope’ where reciprocal involvement is central:  
“After so much rejection, I had a complex about nobody wanting me.  But when I got 
there, it seemed like a place of so much hope that I just burst into tears.  I have always 
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had problems with professionals, but the groups really appealed to me.  It was really 
empowering.  (One resident) asked me about my attempted suicide...and then he walked 
out really upset.  And it just really affected me that - oh my God - I can have so much 
effect on people”  Former resident  
Residents are expected not simply to comply with DTC rules, but to learn how to understand and 
interact with them adaptively.  Greater behavioural disturbance is tolerated than in other mental 
health settings, as clinical crises and rule-breaking are regarded as opportunities for reflective 
sense-making and learning.  All members are encouraged to grasp others’ concerns and explore 
alternative perspectives and solutions. 
“It was a central task for all those coming to the community that they would learn to 
recognise and understand their own feelings and subsequent risk – and through relating 
to others within a structure specifically designed to slow incidents and issues down so 
that they can be understood and thought about before acting.” Senior therapist 1 
Clinical risk is managed by community members drawing upon, interpreting and sometimes 
amending DTC rules, generally supported through the resident hierarchy.  Much relational 
engagement takes place in a mutually constructed liminal area that is neither formally part of the 
organization, nor entirely private (Vaivio, 2006; Warner & Gabe, 2004).  Through the DTC’s 
model, members are encouraged to explore these interactions within the community as a 
therapeutic milieu.  For example, in an informal discussion with a new resident, Simon
5
, his 
upset response to feeling misunderstood by other members prompted the following exchange, in 
which fellow residents linked Simon’s emotional reaction to the intended use of DTC rules.  
Resident A: “After the way you felt last night, you’re looking for rejection and finding it 
when it isn’t there.”  
                                                 
 
5
 All personal names have been disguised 
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Resident B: “You know, you haven’t let us know what is going on for you.  We aren’t 
mind readers...you didn’t approach Top Three and so you created distance for yourself 
and for others...  
Resident A: “You just need time to hear that what has been said to you throughout your 
life, well that really isn’t what is being said to you in here”   
Informal discussion between residents 
Thus, maintaining shared emotional investment in community rules is held to be central to 
maintaining the community as a “safe and therapeutic space” (senior therapist B).  Anxiety or 
concerns held by any resident or staff member is expected to be taken to one of the elected Top 
Three residents who would then liaise with duty staff.  They would together judge whether the 
issue could be contained until the next scheduled meeting, or if an emergency meeting of the 
whole community should be called at any time of the day or night, to provide support and safety.  
While this might involve minor issues such as an untidy kitchen (which often provoked strong 
feelings), meetings would also handle incidents such as self-harm, address disputes, and arrange 
support for distressed residents. 
 
In the case of Miranda, a resident who had cut herself through self-harm, ‘Top Three’ alerted 
duty staff to provide first aid and assess whether further medical attention was needed.  An 
emergency community meeting was called to inform the community and agree which residents 
should accompany Miranda to hospital, together with a staff member.  When she returned, 
another meeting was called to organise peer support during the night.  The entire community is 
obliged to attend such meetings in order to understand events from multiple perspectives.  
Solutions to handling the incidents and members reactions (such as anxiety) were then 
extensively debated until a majority decision was reached.  Such decisions are intended to be 
actively supported by the whole community. 
“Behaviour gets challenged – even any slight worry they’ve got about you acting out or 
anything.  At first I was, like, I don’t really get what you’re worried about.  I never had 
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the insight before to realise where all my problems came from.  But it really makes you 
aware of yourself; it was like I had a life again.”  Resident C 
Residents are often “sensitive to changes in atmosphere” (senior therapist), and may call 
meetings about themselves or others perceived to be experiencing distress, or who are seen at 
risk of harm.  Meetings may be used to organise support, averting possible escalation.  For 
instance, a practice of ‘floors and doors’ involves a rota of volunteers who would sleep nearby a 
resident feeling vulnerable, or remain awake through the night to provide active support. 
Community meetings are chaired and conducted by Top Three residents and are ritualistic and 
formalised in tone.  There are frequent votes for decision-making, taking the form of five 
minutes’ discussion, a call for objections, two ‘tellers’ stand to count votes for, against, and 
abstentions (voting takes place by show of hands).  These meetings are minuted in detail by an 
elected resident acting as secretary, who also reads out the minutes in the following morning’s 
community meeting. 
“The meeting is very formal (ritualised), starting with a name-round ‘for the visitor’.  
There was a reading of the previous day’s very detailed minutes, and notes of discussion, 
which seemed verbatim...This was listened to in silence, with an almost religious 
respect...it felt the reading was being received like a sacred text in a monastery.” 
Fieldnotes 
The staff team fosters the therapeutic functioning of the community.  Many staff members are 
visibly invested in the ‘community as doctor’ model; their authority is gained not through formal 
hierarchy, but their perceived emotional commitment to the community, along with their ability 
to demonstrate authentic interpersonal exchange with residents, as well as each other.  Upholding 
DTC methods, though, can be filled with ambiguity, prompting the exercise of what some 
therapists describe as ‘concertina-like’ authority, whereby staff seek to promote clinical 
perspectives, but without undermining the DTC’s democratic methods. 
“If the culture of enquiry is not carried by residents, it becomes something that the staff 
are left to do.  And when questions come from staff rather than residents, we are accused 
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of being too psychotherapeutic (and) making residents feel vulnerable and abused.  The 
longer (this) goes on, the less communication takes place, and momentum builds for 
things to take place behind the scenes.” Senior therapist 2 
However, this clinical model may amplify personal and organizational reactivity.  The DTC’s 
emphasis on therapeutic (rather than managerial) responses means that members’ emotional and 
behavioural reactions can have a cumulative, disruptive, effect.  Reactions associated with 
interpersonal conflicts, suicide threats, self-harm and intimidation can provoke ‘ripple effects’ of 
emotional contagion (Barsade, 2002), undermining therapy. 
“You live and breathe the (personality disorder) experience here...every pore is fully 
immersed... The dynamics...of this patient population...seep everywhere.  You do enter a 
similar (personality disorder) experience to that of the residents...the staff room (mirrors) 
what’s happening with residents and vice versa... All these things are polluted by the 
dynamics.”  Therapist 3 
At times of frustration and exhaustion, democratic decision-making can increase community 
tensions rather than containing them therapeutically.  Despite a tendency to idealise the DTC 
model, an important shadow side is of ‘groupthink’ (Janis, 1982),  along with scapegoating of 
presumed troublemakers.  
“The first two months I didn't know where the hell I was... I was totally overwhelmed and 
exhausted and I was fighting with them...I took a lot of the community’s anger because of 
my behaviour.  A lot of people were intimidated by it and I ended up getting scapegoated.  
I remember sitting there crying every day, knowing I just needed to stop hurting myself,  I 
needed to be different.”  Resident D 
There can be strong group pressure to evict members seen as untreatable, without considering 
adverse clinical consequences or post-discharge planning.  According to the DTC’s ‘treatability’ 
rule, members who break community rules, such as the prohibition on drugs and alcohol are 
deemed to have automatically discharged themselves, prompting an emergency community 
meeting.  The community can elect to ‘readmit’ residents for a temporary 24 hour period in 
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which those on ‘treatability’ should show motivation to authentically re-engage with the 
community and its rules.  But readmission also depends upon the wider community’s appetite for 
reconciliation. 
“People had simply had enough. The community kicked him out in the middle of the night 
and then later realised that they may have been unnecessarily angry... Sometimes we end 
up making crap decisions.” Therapist 4 
Despite such disruptive potential, the model provides a self-regulating mechanism as participants 
tend to develop a personal interest in others’ emotional reactions.  Experienced members, for 
instance, advocate managing community reactions, tactically “slowing things down” (resident) 
rather than provoking crises. 
“We really don’t want to increase anxiety; people will just go ‘pop’.  The community has 
learned to contain stuff, otherwise we end up having (emergency community meetings) all 
night long.” Therapist 5 
The DTC’s ethics-orientated model attempts not to minimise clinical risk, but maintain it at sub-
critical levels, making it amenable for remedial work.  Incidents and crises are seen as providing 
a means of reflecting upon and challenging DTC decision-making and learning from events.  
Accordingly, notions of ‘connecting’, ‘relating’ and allowing others to ‘understand what’s really 
going on’ are emphasised above formal control. 
 
In managing clinical risk, then, the DTC’s approach hinges upon strongly participative and 
democratic engagement.  Although accountability relationships and reporting were active 
between the DTC, the host NHS Trust and the national commissioners, the DTC was 
commissioned to treat a challenging clinical population according to well-established DTC 
methods; indeed it was required to demonstrate the methods’ clinical and economic effectiveness 
through government-commissioned evaluations.  This early phase of the DTC was generally 
regarded by NHS Trust managers as successful: there were no significant incidents, independent 
evaluations had been positive, and the NHS Trust sought to extend the model in some local 
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services.  However, its unusual commissioning arrangement led to some tensions, particularly 
when new commissioners who were unfamiliar with the DTC’s approach came into post. 
“We go to get beaten up by commissioners, but then we go home again – there’s nothing 
much we can do about (how we work).  This is what we were commissioned to do”.  
Clinical management team 
Nonetheless, given strong local support by the NHS Trust and a promising evaluation (Fiander, 
Burns, Langham & Normand, 2004) the DTC’s indigenous methods of clinical risk management 
remained dominant.  In summary, although the ethics-orientated mode tolerates disruption, it 
seeks a restorative approachof self-regulation in which clinical risk can be contained and handled 
therapeutically by the community, notably through community meetings. 
 
Critical incident: The DTC model of clinical risk management is questioned 
The continued operation of this model was threatened by a critical incident which took place 
during fieldwork, involving two former residents, Mark and John, who had recently completed a 
twelve-month course of therapy.  The two men formed an intimate relationship whilst in the 
DTC and, unknown to DTC staff, moved into a shared apartment after leaving the unit.  Shortly 
afterwards, Mark stabbed John to death during a drunken row.  Although both men had been 
regarded as successfully ‘treated’, Mark was detained in a secure hospital, charged with John’s 
homicide, just weeks after leaving the DTC. 
 
John’s death led to intense shock and grief within the community, but its psychological impact 
was accentuated by feelings of self-doubt, guilt, and torn loyalties to the two men.  Moreover, 
acute anxiety about potential consequences of the incident and likely official inquiries eroded 
members’ confidence in the DTC as a ‘safe and therapeutic’ liminal space.  These internal 
reactions were compounded by the homicide’s repercussions within the wider health care 
system.  Officials from the local NHS Trust (with line managerial responsibility for the DTC), 
NHS commissioners (who funded the DTC) and the Department of Health (responsible for 
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mental health policy) each reacted with anxiety as a high-profile innovation threatened to 
become a policy embarrassment. 
“Of course the homicide caused a great furore.  The chair of (the commissioners) began 
to get anxious he was going to end up with a homicide inquiry... (and) panicked into 
commissioning a risk report of the entire national service... Did it make the Trust 
anxious? Oh my God, yes...it already had two homicide inquiries going on (unrelated to 
the DTC), both of which will severely criticise (it).” Senior official 
Officially, the homicide was not the DTC’s responsibility.  The incident occurred after the men’s 
discharge, and accountability for aftercare formally lay with local agencies.  Nevertheless, NHS 
commissioners regarded residents’ democratic participation in each other’s discharge plans and 
the DTC’s emphasis on community decision-making rather than staff interventions as ‘clinical 
laxity’.  Some senior officials were concerned with “not embarrass(ing) the Minister (of 
Health)”. 
“The homicide is telling: discharge planning was done by other punters rather than by 
clinicians.  Staff keep saying that these are some of the most dangerous and manipulative 
patients that there are.  Yet they don’t take clinical responsibility for them...it’s literally 
the case of ‘the lunatics running the asylum’.  It’s scandalous...the project is unsafe.”  
Senior official 
 
A rising rules-based mode of clinical risk management produces escalating conflict 
Under strong external pressure to bring the DTC in line with ‘normal’ clinical risk management 
procedures, the NHS Trust’s board imposed its standard risk management procedures and 
governance arrangements.  The Trust sought to enforce strict control through weekly risk reports 
from the DTC, official inspections, and greater involvement of Trust managers in clinical 
decision-making.   
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This imposed clinical risk management system interacted with the DTC’s ability to function 
therapeutically, disrupting its indigenous model for managing substantive clinical risks.  The 
circumstances of this critical incident are complex, as indeed are possible internal and external 
influences on parties’ various reactions to the event.  Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that the 
following four-stage process transformed the DTC from its self-regulating ethics-orientated 
mode to a dysfunctional unit, riven by escalating conflict between contrasting modes of clinical 
risk management. 
 
Imposed formal risk assessment 
Firstly, what had been an essentially personal, therapeutic space was increasingly formalised 
through transparent reporting of calculable risks.  Initially, the NHS Trust conducted an 
immediate internal homicide inquiry, bringing in senior executives and clinical experts from the 
field of forensic psychiatry, whose knowledge base and practices were centred on actuarial risk 
calculations by professionals, and risk management enforced through high levels of physical 
security.  The inquiry investigated the DTC’s documentation and recorded interviews with DTC 
residents and staff, as well as external professionals involved in the case.  It produced a highly 
critical report of DTC’s risk assessment practices, concluding that ‘no-one was flying the 
aircraft; and no-one was looking out of the window’ (Trust internal inquiry). 
 
The national commissioners appointed a senior director to conduct a ‘root and branch’ 
comprehensive risk assessment of the DTC, along with the two other DTC units, involving 
independent scrutiny of all policies, procedures and practices, organizational as well as clinical, 
and inspections of the physical environment.  The local NHS Trust directed that DTC staff 
conduct comparable local risk assessments and report plans for managing identified risks to the 
Trust board.  This shift from clinical risk management based on substantive first order risks to 
assessing and reporting calculable second order risks was initially resisted by the DTC. 
“Bringing to light some of the risks that there are over has not been an easy process. It 
has meant clashes in management styles and expectations. And I guess the director and 
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the DTC team feel they are getting reined in and being unfairly questioned and 
scrutinised.” Trust executive i 
Nevertheless, the Trust board insisted that DTC risks be formally identified, recorded and 
reported, in line with its other mental health services.  These included regular audits of potential 
ligature points (physical features that could support a noose for strangulation), formally 
recording clinical discussions associated with discharge planning, and recording what managers 
constructed as ‘advice on clinical risks’ given by staff to residents.  Trust managers challenged 
the DTC’s strongly participative interpretation of the Care Programme Approach, arguing that 
formal clinical responsibility should override residents’ decision-making. 
“You are in conflict straight away between the trust’s quite directive approaches versus 
that of the DTC which says we have to get agreement from (residents).  To some degree 
we do need their cooperation, but it is a question of who has the last say...(about) their 
willingness to identify risks and to have (an approach) for dealing with them” Trust 
executive ii 
Given perceived difficulties in conducting such formal risk assessment, the Trust’s director 
responsible for risk management set up a weekly risk management meeting with the DTC 
clinical director and clinical management team to assess and manage identified risks, tying these 
to reports of ongoing clinical incidents. 
“The nature of how the service runs is risky. It’s really brought into focus the risks in the 
service... It’s been a wake-up call for the execs that jeez, we should have been on top of 
this earlier and made sure systems were in place. We’re carrying a lot of risks that we 
weren’t aware of.” Trust executive iii 
 
External steering of clinical risk management 
Secondly, these formal risk assessments enabled Trust managers and commissioners to steer 
clinical practices.  The DTC had traditionally invited professional visitors to the community to 
observe some of the democratic-therapeutic model (partially to stimulate interest amongst 
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potential referrers).  After the homicide, these visits became a means for Trust managers and 
commissioners to directly assess the community, compare interactions against standard clinical 
risk management practices, and direct alternative responses.   
 
For instance, the CEO and Chair of the NHS Trust conducted a joint visit, during which they 
suspected two residents were in a sexual relationship.  Sexual relations were discouraged, but not 
prohibited according to DTC rules, as they were considered potentially useful for therapeutic 
learning.  Fearing a repeat of the recent circumstances of the homicide, they demanded the 
clinical director stop this relationship (suggesting the residents be threatened with discharge if 
they did not comply), and formally record this as a clinical risk management intervention. 
“We said to the clinical director: look, you need to do something to stop it.  These people 
should be concentrating on their therapy, not on having this relationship... A lot of work 
had to go on from here to say have you counselled those individuals, have you recorded 
that you have counselled (them) and have you advised the different agencies.  The 
community should have been firmer about what was acceptable.” Trust executive iv 
Such external steering was experienced by DTC as interfering in the community’s democratic 
decision-making, and some staff felt it undermined the DTC’s well-established model of clinical 
risk management. 
“There is something about the unknown that unnerves them so the trust goes to what they 
think is solid ground... But residents should not be made to feel like subjects of risk, 
debris of pathology...whose behaviour needs to be tagged and monitored.  Are residents 
allowed to show (feelings), or are they slapped down to keep their feelings inside?”  
Senior therapist 2 
External officials’ strong reactions to the community’s ‘inner life’ accentuated internal anxiety 
about repercussions following the homicide, and what some feared might be a ‘witch hunt’. 
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“The pressure has been immense...enormously traumatic... We have all this anxiety 
around...a chain reaction...that the finger of blame needs to be pointed somewhere for 
(officials) to be satisfied...” Senior therapist 6 
 
Some adoption of rules-based regulation, but growing contradictions 
Thirdly, despite proclaimed opposition, there was some adoption of externally imposed risk 
management practices by the DTC clinical management team, now determined to assert stronger 
clinical authority on the community. 
 
“The question of the role of staff is important. Do we lead or are we for only part of the 
community? Maybe staff will need to take a stronger position, like the Director has said. 
Is it that the residents rule the community instead of staff? So it is on their terms? 
Because then we lose our respect and authority.” Therapist 4 
Senior staff adopted a subtly stronger position, overruling community opposition.  The 
community was becoming “more authoritarian, but it’s not explicit... We act less as one 
organization; a sense of being in it together” (Therapist 7). 
 
Anxious about their professional careers and livelihoods, some staff weakened adherence to 
DTC principles, covertly conveying confidential clinical information to external agencies.  
Despite overtly resisting the CEO’s demands to stop sexual relationships between residents, a 
senior therapist later pointed out to a resident that he should inform his probation officer about 
his relationship with another resident: “you have to understand that if your probation officer 
isn’t seen to be completely on the ball, her career is on the line – you need to find a way of 
managing that by revealing more about what’s going on” (senior therapist 8).  In a subsequent 
staff team discussion, therapists were preoccupied about what clinical information they should 
convey to external agencies, “covering ourselves, in case the shit hits the fan” (senior therapist 
1). 
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Staff seem anxious – what is our stance in relation to probation? (A DTC leader) says, 
‘no I didn’t tell them about (the residents’ relationship)...well actually I did, (but) said to 
(the probation officer) I didn’t say that did I?’  (The DTC leader) suddenly looks 
mischievous.  A senior nurse tries to clarify: ‘if he puts himself at risk, what will that do 
to us? What are the implications for us?’  This time more reassuring, (the DTC leader) 
says... ‘we have to work with (probation) – and we have to get (the resident) to work with 
them.’ Fieldnotes 
 
Residents were highly sensitive to this sensed shift in staff’s emotional investment, particularly 
from senior clinical staff who were perceived to have adopted more formal risk management 
perspectives. 
“There is not one community here - there are two.  I really don’t trust staff.  You can’t 
call it a community when you can’t talk with them about anything. They have far too 
much control - you can’t call it democratic.” Resident E 
This division provoked strong negative reactions from residents, articulated in a growing 
distance between staff and resident subcultures, which eroded residents’ adherence to DTC rules. 
 
Drug-taking came to light overnight when a resident started throwing furniture around.  
Police ‘legged it’ into the resident’s bedroom and made two arrests.  Next morning, a 
senior resident hesitantly acknowledges her involvement – she has taken amphetamines, 
cocaine, ecstasy, ketamine, ‘dope’, the list seems endless.  She’s had previous drug 
convictions and is terrified of being arrested... Eight other residents were involved, but 
alcohol is far more widespread – unofficial partying has been going on for weeks.  Staff 
look visibly shocked, and insist the full picture of others’ involvement is disclosed.  Tom 
(another resident) storms out of the community meeting shouting, ‘I’m addicted to 
‘speed’, I need help, not this!’  Top Three (had) colluded by protecting intoxicated 
residents, keeping them away from staff, and distracting staff by accusing them of 
bullying.  Fieldnotes 
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The staff team were shaken by this incident and its repercussions triggering further involvement 
from the Trust.  The DTC clinical management team immediately discharged residents held 
directly responsible and demanded the community evict a further six.  They next directed all 
remaining residents to consent to police tests for drug and alcohol use, insisting that those 
unwilling to sign a consent form would be evicted: “the Trust was more disturbed by this 
outbreak of drug taking and the (outside) gossip around this.  I insisted on random drug testing - 
not very DTC!”  (senior therapist 8).   
 
In the following community meeting, forms were being passed between residents in silence, 
consenting to police taking random samples of residents, of saliva, urine, blood and hair, any 
time of day or night: 
I’m struck by the seemingly draconian and legalistic consent form... the clinical director 
is taking advice from the drugs liaison police.  Afterwards, junior staff disagree about the 
new arrangements: ‘we are far too reactive, we really undermine the residents.  Surely, 
there’s another way?  They really have a sense that we are constantly checking up on 
them and it’s really not helping us or them’... But DTC leaders refuse to compromise, ‘we 
need to work with (this decision) - it’s not going to be reversed’.  Fieldnotes 
These measures further increased division and eroded community morale as staff struggled to 
maintain shared purpose.  In place of ethics-orientated self-regulation, a procedural mindset was 
becoming more dominant.  Despite staff insisting they remained committed to therapeutic 
participation, residents resented what they experienced as a ‘betrayal’ by therapists whose belief 
in democratic practices appeared compromised.  In turn, therapists noted a major change in the 
community’s democratic-therapeutic ethos, resulting in a loss of their moral authority: 
“We tried to hang onto some semblance of authority.  But the power the trust and 
commissioners were exercising over us diminished our ability to manage the attacks from 
residents, paradoxically...while the level of attacks was going up.  I felt I no longer had 
the moral authority to provide guidance.” Senior therapist 2 
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Politicisation of community space 
Finally, the DTC’s capacity to contain clinical risk was disrupted by members’ reactions to the 
rising mode of formal risk management.   
“It’s like a prison stand-off - like people are trying to psyche each other out.  Who’s 
going to break first?  Who’s going to be able to stay silent the longest?  The most 
powerful people are the ones who say nothing.  Because you can’t work them out; they 
give nothing away.”  Resident F 
Within the staff team, there was increasing uncertainty and division about how to manage 
deteriorating relations and escalating clinical incidents, producing a sense of paralysis.  
There is an air of urgency - every member of the DTC management team is present. 
Community tensions have reached an intensity staff have never encountered before, it 
seems the community is on the verge of breakdown.  A senior therapist, warns, ‘if staff 
and residents don’t work together, we’ll have to close, it’s just too dangerous’... A senior 
therapist says it’s a problem of emotional exhaustion: ‘It’s critical that we deal with the 
sense of staff deficit, we’re as stuck as they are – we’re like a broken record.”  Fieldnotes 
of staff meeting 
Fuelled by intense anger and recrimination, deteriorating relations between staff and residents 
fostered a dissident and secretive resident subculture.   
“The past months have been hell. There’s been a complete lack of trust. The community 
has been in chaos... There was no protected time, no retreat… it’s like a year in Beirut.” 
Resident C 
DTC members’ sense of a mutually-constructed liminal space collapsed as informal leaders 
emerged, resisted authority, steered resident decision-making and orchestrated conflicts with 
staff.  Instead of upholding the DTC’s democratically established rules, residents protected each 
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other from staff scrutiny as they devised drug deals, organised illicit parties, and established a 
new norm of sexual relations between residents. 
“There was this mob mentality – there was absolutely no functioning aspect of the group 
I could appeal to.  The staff picked up the pieces every morning after a bloody bomb had 
gone off over night... The community became disembowelled - every day was like a 
nuclear reactor without the container.  There was nothing around to hold the explosion.”  
Senior therapist 2 
Staff-resident exchanges became embattled, undermining the DTC’s capacity to manage clinical 
risks and ‘ordinary’ disturbances.  Despite daily risk reports being sent for the personal attention 
of the Trust CEO, managers’ efforts to instil order in the DTC acted perversely, exacerbating 
disturbances and increasing substantive clinical risk. 
“We had nothing to hold onto because everything kept changing.  The trust’s risk 
management group met with us week after week and couldn’t understand why we were 
still open; they kept saying...that the level of risk was just too high.” Senior therapist 6 
 
Collapse of the DTC  
Given escalating incidents, tensions between the DTC and the Trust and commissioners became 
openly confrontational.  As external NHS officials engaged with the heightened disturbance 
within the DTC, their personal reactions became part of the story.  Trust managers and 
commissioners were emotionally “pulled into an all-consuming (engagement)...you give your 
whole life to that unit.”  (Trust executive iii) 
“I didn’t go in with body armour, but at one point I thought I might have to.  One of the 
staff was crying and I thought, here we go…! My ears were already burning before I got 
there.  And by the time I did, I think that burning effigies would probably be next on the 
agenda.”  Senior official 
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As NHS officials were drawn into charged conflicts, political pressure increased on the host 
Trust, producing a downward spiral of reactions. 
“In a situation in which the commissioners didn’t understand the model and acted highly 
emotionally, this upped the ante even more... It makes the board anxious, it really does.” 
Trust executive iv 
Unaccustomed to such antagonism, one official described his experience of meeting with DTC 
leaders and staff as “poisonous...the atmosphere is just so intense that people just get fried up… I 
have never in all my experience faced that degree of hostility.  It is the only organization that 
(the national commissioners) agreed never to meet single-handed” (Senior official) 
 
Although the commissioned risk report concluded all three DTCs were ‘basically safe’, warning 
that greater clinical risk would arise with rapid closure, the NHS commissioners and local Trust 
decided to quickly close the unit, discharging all residents within a matter of weeks.  Despite 
positive independent evaluations (Fiander et al, 2004), officials had become emotionally drawn 
into confrontation and lost confidence in the unit.  As one described: 
“(They decided)...to wrap up quite a lot at one go.  I’m astounded at the failure of the 
Trust to support the place.  We end up with the service collapsing because it did was 
what it was asked to do.  But politically, there were some ‘shenanigans’ went on and the 
thing collapsed.  There is a serious underestimation of the dynamics of these 
(interagency) relationships and how they work.” Senior official 
In summary, the homicide was a critical incident with two key effects.  Firstly, the DTC’s 
indigenous ethics-orientated method of clinical risk management was undermined by the external 
imposition of formal risk management, triggered by the homicide.  Secondly, tensions between 
these two incommensurable modes of clinical risk management contributed to greater clinical 
disturbance and escalating conflict, both internally and in interaction with external agencies.  The 
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story ends with what had been seen as a promising organizational experiment unexpectedly 
being closed
6
. 
 
Concluding discussion: why contradictions and intractable conflict rather 
than hybridisation? 
 
Our finding of overt contest between conflicting modes of clinical risk management contrasts 
with much literature reviewed earlier.  Returning to our heuristic (see Figure 1), our case 
elucidates interlinked dimensions along which the two contrasting modes of clinical risk 
management interacted perversely.   
 
Conflicting truth discourses: From background tension to overt contest and conflict 
We suggest the homicide can be seen as a critical incident that precipitated a collision between 
ethics-orientated and rules-based modes of clinical risk management.  Interagency tensions over 
accountability and blame for this incident shifted rules-based clinical risk management from a 
background resource to an alternative truth regime, proposed, suggested, and imposed (Foucault, 
1996) by worried managers and commissioners. 
 
As Kosmala and McKernan (2010) argue, ethics-orientated regulation is never entirely separate 
from rules-based forms; the balance between them is dynamic and tends to vary between 
different epochs.  Nevertheless, rules-based regulation may remain a background social 
framework.  In our empirical case, the pre-incident DTC had drawn upon, re-interpreted, and 
                                                 
 
6
 Both the original DTC, dating from the 1940s, and the other ‘sister’ DTC were later closed, as NHS policy 
subsequently shifted away from DTCs towards high secure, forensic settings. 
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assimilated into its ethics-orientated clinical risk management certain external codes, notably 
adapting some principles of the Care Programme Approach (as described below).  But 
authorities’ increased involvement with the community and its ‘inner life’ brought into play 
contradictory truth discourses about how risks should be constructed, identified and handled.  
Clashes arose not just over substantive clinical risks (notably, sexual relations, drugs and alcohol 
use), but second order risks of reputation and performance (Power, 2007), important in NHS 
regulation systems. 
 
So how did these competing ‘truth regimes’ interact?  In contrast to much of the literature 
reviewed earlier, we find the development of escalating contest and contradictions with two key 
effects: firstly, erosion of the ethical basis of self-regulation and secondly, the developmemt of 
intractable conflict.  Imposing rules-based ideals undermined valued aspects of therapeutic 
relations and eroded staff and residents’ shared commitment to an ethics-orientated mode of self-
regulation.  This did not, however, lead to rules-based clinical risk management becoming 
dominant.  As parties’ various efforts to steer risk management practices and decision making 
became mutually mistrusted, the community’s carefully ‘negotiated order’ (Strauss, Schatzman, 
Bucher, Ehrlich & Sabshin, 1964) was disrupted.  In its place, overt (and covert) contest between 
conflicting notions of clinical risk management interacted perversely, eroding moral authority 
and undermining members’ trust in the DTC as a ‘safe and therapeutic space’. 
 
Contradictory practices: Non-hybridising, but conflicting modes 
The DTC’s indigenous clinical risk management practices had developed gradually through a 
participative method involving deep relational engagement, reflecting on shared experience, and 
collective decision-making.  These practices were relatively well defined, tended to be internally 
coherent, and they were strongly embedded within the community.  Furthermore, they were tied 
to a set of ethics-orientated principles that promoted therapeutic meaning and interpretation.  In 
the charged and risk averse policy environment following the homicide, certain DTC practices 
such as democratisation (residents’ influence in democratic decision-making), permissiveness 
(privileging experiential learning over strict adherence to rules) and communalism (care plans 
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based on relationship building, rather than administration) came to be regarded as inherently 
risky and in need of urgent reform.  Indications of inadequate discharge planning triggered 
interventions from the host NHS Trust and national commissioners who imposed statutory NHS 
clinical risk management practices, minimising scope for local interpretation. 
 
These introduced rules-based practices were experienced, though, not as neutral ‘technologies’ 
(Miller & Rose, 2008), but morally laden and designed to attribute blame and punishment.  
Demands that DTC staff should monitor, record and report resident activities – and that residents 
should ‘confess’ intimate relations, report illicit drug taking, and allow examination of bodies 
through substance testing – were experienced as authorities’ efforts to control and dominate 
‘subjects of risk...debris of pathology’ (senior therapist).  Clinical risk management practices thus 
became aligned with deeply held and contested positions. 
 
Whereas heterogeneous practices certainly mixed in the DTC’s post-incident phase, instead of 
the complementarity (Roberts, 2001), managed tension, (Gendron, 2002; Rahaman et al., 2010) 
or hybridisation and proliferation of practices (Miller et al., 2008) noted by other scholars, we 
find clinical risk management techniques were used as devices by parties seeking to control and 
outmanoeuvre each other.  Through intensifying their use of rules-based codes, for example, 
DTC leaders attempted to weaken residents’ – and some staff members’ – engagement in the 
embedded ethics-orientated regime (through which they could democratically outvote DTC 
leadership).  Conversely, residents’ anger at what they experienced as ‘untrustworthy’ attempts 
by DTC staff to take control stimulated a strongly politicised response amongst residents who 
became increasingly engaged in challenging, subverting and overtly refusing hierarchical 
authority.  In relation to our Foucauldian framing, the DTC’s original ethics-orientation may be 
seen as later developing an ‘agonistic exteriority’ to domination (Foucault 2011), in which 
residents’ outspokenness, self-determination, and opposition to authority became central. 
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Altered forms of reflexivity: From intersubjective relations to externally orientated 
defensiveness 
DTC members’ reactions towards imposed formal clinical risk management after the homicide 
shifted patterns of reflexivity that had been sensitised to relations within the community.  As 
emerging second order risk representations recast DTC practices from ‘exemplary’ forms of 
service user involvement to risky ‘clinical laxity’, members’ sensitivities to external judgement 
and criticism increased.  We suggest this shift altered intersubjective reflexivity to produce more 
self-conscious intra-subjective patterns, orientated towards external judgement. 
 
These altered patterns of reflexivity following the homicide – shifting from an interpersonal to an 
externally facing focus – disrupted members’ sensitivity to intersubjective relations within the 
community.  Whereas the DTC’s original therapeutic model promoted a sophisticated ‘craft’ of 
intersubjective reflexivity to manage first order risks, members’ increasing orientation towards 
second order scrutiny produced reactive defensiveness.  Whereas increased awareness of external 
perspectives might have served as an important learning resource (Kosmala & McKernan, 2010; 
Luhmann, 1993), we rather see increased self-consciousness and defensiveness amongst DTC 
residents and staff, fearing “the finger of blame” (senior therapist), disciplinary action and, in the 
case of DTC staff, potential damage to their professional careers. 
 
Emotionally charged intersubjective relations: The emotional organization 
Finally, an important aspect of this case was the development of intersubjective relations 
characterised by strong personal and group engagement, which were experienced as emotionally 
intense.  This analysis fits with much of the approach of one school of organizational studies 
which emphasises the role of emotions in organizations, as a corrective to rationalist, 
functionalist or institutionalist accounts (Fineman, 2008; Gabriel, 1999).  In our case study, high 
levels of emotion and personal values invested in contested modes of clinical risk management 
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produced intense and intractable ‘relational turbulence’ (Fischer, 2012) within and between 
organizations, to which commissioners, managers, clinicians and residents actively contributed. 
 
Much sociological accounting literature does not consider emotional loading in risk management 
and accountability regimes, tending instead towards an assumption of ‘cool’ climates, 
characterised by pervasive rational techniques.  An important exception is Roberts et al’s (2006) 
study of meetings between executives and investment advisers, involving major ‘points of 
anxiety’.  Executives’ anxieties about face-to-face meetings with advisers, ‘seeing the whites of 
their eyes’, led them to intensive preparations.  These meetings produced strong self-disciplining 
effects, accompanied by a strong desire to avoid conflict as executives conscientiously rehearsed 
presentations to investment advisers. 
 
In our case, by contrast, external authorities were drawn into emotionally charged face-to-face 
meetings with DTC members, whilst this closer involvement with the community only increased 
officials’ anxiety and reactivity to its “intense atmosphere” (senior official).  This high 
emotional loading produced ‘heated’ intersubjective exchanges and mobilised underlying 
tensions, leading to escalating and intractable conflict.  Instead of rehearsed performances 
(Roberts et al 2006), we see competing beliefs and values, polemical resistance and, in the case 
of some residents, attempts to undermine formal clinical risk management. 
 
Incommensurable clinical risk management regimes: moving from contradictions and 
contest to intractable conflict 
Returning to our Foucauldian heuristic, our case study reveals how contrasting ethics-orientated 
and rules-based modes of clinical risk management interact across the four dimensions described 
above.  Empirically, we find neither hybridisation (2008), complementarity (Roberts, 2001) nor 
managed tension (Grendron, 2002; Rahaman et al, 2010), but rather heightened contradictions 
and contest between modes, in which differences are exaggerated and reinforced, leading to 
intractable conflict. 
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These tensions may partly be explained as incommensurability between contrasting ‘truth 
regimes’ or paradigms which interact but ‘talk past each other’ as they lack commonality.  In 
Kuhn’s (1996) study of scientific revolutions, he argues that there are occasional but radical 
shifts between incommensurable scientific paradigms (such as the transition from Newtonian to 
Einsteinian physics).  His notion of paradigm includes specific theories, rules and methods, as 
well as internally coherent constructions of problems and possible solutions.  Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) used the concept of paradigm incommensurability in the field of organizational studies to 
examine different schools of organizational analysis, reflecting differing epistemologies, theories 
and values.  Indeed radical paradigmatic disputes are evident over substantive and theoretical 
questions about organizational change and leadership (Learmonth, 2006) and strategic 
management, where schools of thought have proliferated (Scherer, 1998).  According to these 
perspectives, incommensurability involves radically different orientation systems that compete 
over issues of shared importance, where an acceptable means of adjudicating these tensions and 
conflicting values is lacking (Scherer, 1998; Tadajewski, 2009). 
 
We question, though, whether this paradigmatic argument is sufficiently sensitive to micro-level 
interactions that may be important empirically.  Whereas the notion of paradigm emphasises 
differences operating at the highest cognitive level (Kuhn, 1996), this perspective may neglect 
micro-level processes, beliefs and practices that proliferate in the ‘undecided space’ between 
rules-based risk management systems and the situated practices and orientations of active 
subjects (Iedema, Jorm, Braithwaite, Travaglia & Lum, 2006; Iedema & Rhodes, 2010; 
McGivern & Fischer, 2010).  For instance, we found some evidence of early hybridisation as the 
DTC appropriated certain external rules-based ‘resources’ (Kosmala & McKernan, 2010; 
McGivern & Fischer, 2010), modifying certain elements of the Care Programme Approach from 
an administrative technique to a relationship-based practice.  DTC staff insisted that statutory 
meetings with other agencies should include residents as a means of influencing statutory 
decision-making.  Such re-modelling was initially regarded by the local NHS Trust and outside 
agencies as exemplary (if sometimes challenging) user-orientated practice. 
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Whereas the pre-incident DTC adopted certain external influences, in the events following the 
homicide, interactions between contrasting clinical risk management modes disrupted internally 
coherent practices and mentalities, such as DTC clinical leaders’ commitment to democratic-
therapeutic principles.  Instead of ready hybridisation, we found contradictions in which 
differences between positions were reinforced, building tensions and overt conflict.  In the 
homicide’s aftermath, interactions between parties destabilised the internal coherence of ethics-
orientated clinical risk management, partially disrupting its established practices, processes and 
expertises.  Then, as the rules-based mode impinged upon indigenous practices, ideological and 
emotional tensions between these two modes escalated.  Thus, interactions between clinical risk 
management regimes mixed distinctive techniques with underlying values.  For instance, 
authorities’ focus on formal risk management dealt less with ‘ontological facts’7 than with 
second order constructions of deviance, through which culpability might be externally attributed 
and sanctions applied (Douglas, 1992).  This focus created moral outrage within the DTC, 
prompting vociferous ‘truth telling’ about what some perceived to be authorities’ self-interested 
and defensive motives.  These two interacting ‘truth regimes’ thus contained and mixed emotions 
and values as well as rational elements. 
 
One theoretical suggestion emerging from the case is, therefore, the possible linkage between 
strong emotions and the possibility of hybridisation
8
.  Strong and sustained surges of 
organizational emotion may produce ‘intractability’ and reduce the scope for ready hybridisation 
to occur in the field.  Conversely, we suggest hybridisation may be more likely to occur in 
settings with weaker emotional engagement. 
                                                 
 
7
 In the case of the DTC, the government-commissioned risk report found the DTC to be ‘essentially safe’, while the 
external homicide inquiry focused on outside agencies formally held responsible for John’s and Mark’s post-
discharge care. 
8
 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this point 
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We suggest these findings may helpfully rebalance the current scholarship on hybridisation, 
particularly its current emphasis on micro-technologies of control through routines and scripts.  
In Power’s (2011) recent review of Foucault’s impact on sociology and accounting scholarship, 
he stresses themes of power-knowledge, involving pervasive micro-technologies of disciplinary 
control.  Within this perspective, there is a redirection of analytic attention away from ideology 
and values to an emphasis on classifications, routines and scripts, involving: ‘a shift in 
ontological commitment from the cognitive basis of social order to a conception of order 
grounded in surface habits and practical action’ (Power, 2011: 50).  In our analysis, by contrast, 
we find the pervasive presence of competing values-based practices and risk management 
ideologies, accompanied by intense organizational emotions, and face-to-face confrontations.  
This is a ‘hot’ rather than ‘cool’ organizational climate, where values trump routines and scripts.  
Indeed, shared commitment to indigenous beliefs within a mode of ethics-orientated care was an 
important basis of internal resistance whereby some members sought to actively ‘deface the 
currency’ (Foucault, 2011) of imposed control technologies. 
 
Foucault’s (2010; 2011) later research into morally-charged refusal and courageous resistance in 
relation to normative codes helpfully informed the development of our heuristic.  This heuristic 
enabled us to analyse our empirical case study in a structured and theoretically informed manner, 
sensitive both to rules-based technologies of ‘governmentality’ (Miller & Rose, 2008) as well as 
ethics-orientated care of oneself and others.  Yet our findings suggest important limitations to 
Foucault’s description of ethics-orientated care of the self.  Whereas ethics-orientated social 
practice may indeed involve polemical resistance and ‘the courage of truth’, under some 
circumstances it can also produce perverse and ultimately self-damaging dynamics. 
 
Does our case study have wider implications?  Although we acknowledge this is a single case 
study drawn from an unusual setting, extreme cases such as this may illuminate important 
dynamics that are less visible in other settings (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Similar contradictions may 
emerge where formal risk management practices are imported into other value-laden and 
emotionally charged settings, particularly where strong interpersonal engagement has historically 
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supported locally-generated modes of self-regulation.  Such settings include human service 
organizations with clinical or educational orientations, social movement organizations and even 
religious settings, whose ‘inner logics’ may resist externally imposed risk management practices.   
 
Future research should study further examples of contradictions as well as hybridisation between 
different modes of risk management.  In the broader field of risk management, future work 
should specify conditions which limit ready hybridisation, exploring the possible utility of the 
concepts advanced here of values-based practices, organizational emotions and ethics-orientated 
resistance.  Finally, future work which continues to move sociological accounting literature 
traditionally developed within corporate risk management and accountability systems into 
distinctive and (from this perspective) novel fields including clinical risk management may 
helpfully illuminate and problematise the broad contemporary phenomenon of rising formal risk 
management systems apparent across diverse organizations in much of society. 
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